This report is based on interviews conducted with officials and judicial personnel in Tripoli, Zawiya, and Misrata between April and September 2024. Human Rights Watch met with the general prosecutor, the justice minister of the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity, the Libyan Bar Association, presidents of courts in Zawiya, lawyers at the Supreme Court and the Tripoli Appeals Court, and several defense lawyers. Researchers also met with civil society members and UN officials. This report is also based on a review and analysis of relevant laws and practices and open-source information.
All interviews were conducted in Arabic. Human Rights Watch explained the purpose of the interviews to interviewees and obtained their consent to use the information they provided for this report. Human Rights Watch did not pay interviewees.
Lawyers and judges requested anonymity for fear of reprisals and all names withheld are indicated in footnotes. Information in this report is current at time of writing.
Human Rights Watch sent letters, annexed to this report, to the Libyan general prosecutor, the minister of justice at the Government of National Unity, and the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to request additional information. The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court responded to Human Rights Watch on May 19, and the response is annexed to this report. Human Rights Watch had not received responses from the Libyan general prosecutor and the minister of justice at the Government of National Unity by the time of publication.
The biggest challenge to Libya’s judiciary is the deep political divide between the entities in the east and west vying to control and govern the country. Two rival entities compete for control over resources, institutions, and territory in Libya and operate with near impunity. The Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) was appointed in March 2021 as an interim authority through a UN-brokered consensus process. Together with affiliated armed groups and abusive security agencies, it controls western Libya. The Libyan Presidential Council is also Tripoli-based. The GNU’s rivals, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) and affiliated security apparatuses and militias, control eastern and southern Libya. The “Libyan Government” is a civilian authority linked to the LAAF, which administers territory under the LAAF’s control.
Formally, Libya has one legal system comprised of the High Judicial Council, the Libyan Supreme Court and its constitutional chamber, the general prosecutor, and the appeals courts. However, in practice, the actual jurisdiction of these judicial authorities is often more limited, and their ability to execute summons, sentences, and release orders depends on the cooperation of the political factions and various armed groups who control different parts of the country. The general prosecutor has nominal jurisdiction over the entire country, but given the division of power between the GNU and the LAAF, there are real limitations on his ability to summon or order the release of defendants in both the east and the west of the country. Libya also has a separate military criminal justice system.
Supreme Court
Political divisions are at the root of a deeply divided judicial system unable to deliver justice fairly. The key judicial institutions are in entrenched conflict, undermining the Supreme Court and its ability to function and exercise jurisdiction over the entire country.
There are dual legislative authorities in Libya, with the eastern-based House of Representatives, elected in 2014, and the western-based High Council of State, a consultative body formed through the 2015 Libya Political Agreement largely to appease remnants of the previous parliamentary body, the General National Congress.
These two legislative bodies are at odds, which has led to political stalemate and undermined the Supreme Court’s authority, including over elections laws, preventing national elections from taking place since 2018. The Libyan Supreme Court’s constitution chamber ruled in 2014 that the House of Representatives’ election was based on unconstitutional legislation, resulting in the House rejecting the Court’s ruling and by extension its authority. The House of Representatives in 2022 passed a decree establishing a Supreme Constitutional Court in Benghazi in a bid to undercut the Supreme Court, although it has not yet issued any rulings. This presented a challenge to the Supreme Court’s constitutional chamber and introduced the risk of two rival courts issuing contradictory rulings.
These political rifts have deeply undermined the Supreme Court, which has become unable or unwilling to review appeals in the sequence they are lodged, instead selectively reviewing cases not considered to be politically sensitive to the groups and parties in control. According to a Supreme Court lawyer, the two legislative bodies operate “outside the realm of legitimacy” as their mandates have expired, and the Supreme Court did not want to be dragged into “this game” between competing authorities. Sensitive cases on hold include multiple appeals lodged at the Supreme Court contesting the legality of the appointment of some judges, as well as challenging the constitutionality of appointing the head of the Supreme Court, the general prosecutor, and the president of the Supreme Judicial Council, the Supreme Court lawyer said.
Military Trials of Civilians
Military courts in the east and west continue to prosecute civilians under the guise of “terrorism”-related crimes. The House of Representatives in 2017 amended the Code of Military Procedure and the Military Penal Code to widen “the scope of the military prosecution’s powers,” allowing for more civilians to be tried in military courts, according to the general prosecutor. The amended laws bring “perpetrators of terrorist crimes” and crimes in any location, vehicle, or company operated by the military under the jurisdiction of the military courts, regardless of the accused’s status. The general prosecutor said he had discussed with the House of Representatives concerns around the military procedures law and the need for a new law that limits the military courts’ jurisdiction.
Military prosecutors are often not qualified to investigate civilians and they lack independence, being under the authority of competing defense ministers in the east and the west. For example, lawyers were not allowed to enter and attend investigations at Mitiga prison, under the control of al-Radaa armed group, and the military prosecutor refused to meet with them, according to the Libyan Bar Association.
The Bar Association told Human Rights Watch that the military prosecution treats lawyers poorly and does not always respect release orders. In eastern Libya, Mohamed Hussein al-Jerroushi, a lawyer, has been detained in Benghazi on orders of the military prosecution since 2016, despite a judgment ruling that both the civil and military prosecution lacked jurisdiction in his case. Libyan MP Hassan Al-Farjani Jablallah has been detained at a military facility in Tripoli since February 2023, even though he is a civilian, according to the general prosecutor.
Trying civilians in military courts is incompatible with the right to a fair trial under human rights law. In particular, such trials violate the right to be tried before an independent and impartial tribunal. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the continent’s principal human rights body, has also emphasized that military courts should not have jurisdiction over civilians in any circumstances whatsoever.
Human Rights Watch strongly opposes trials of civilians before military courts in all circumstances, as these proceedings severely undermine due process rights and because of how authoritarian governments have also used them to muzzle peaceful dissent.
Safety and Security
The state does not provide adequate protection to legal professionals, defendants, and witnesses in Libya. Attacks, intimidation, and harassment are common and remain ongoing.
The UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya documented “alleged arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and (attempted) killing of several judges and prosecutors,” in Benghazi, Tripoli, Sirte, and Sabha.
A lawyer at the Tripoli Court of Appeal said security challenges for judicial personnel persisted. The Libyan Bar Association in Tripoli said there were cases in which judges did not order the release of a defendant due to fear of the prosecution. In one minor offense case, a female judge in Tripoli ordered the release of a defendant, but the head of prosecution went to see her and “made her change her judgment, so the defendant was detained for two weeks,” the Bar Association said. They also said that in 2023, a female prosecutor in western Libya was attacked by unidentified men who allegedly pulled her out of her car and beat her.
In 2020, unidentified armed attackers assassinated lawyer Hanan al-Barassi, an outspoken critic of violations by armed groups, in broad daylight in eastern Libya’s Benghazi, without consequence. The 2014 killing of prominent human rights lawyer Salwa Bughaighis in Benghazi, and the abduction of her husband by unidentified assailants, remains unsolved, with no accountability for these crimes.
In 2023, members of the armed group al-Radaa physically hit a lawyer, so defense lawyers stopped work for three days until the alleged perpetrators were arrested. The perpetrators were detained for two days at Jdeidah prison in Tripoli until the affected lawyer waived his right to press charges, according to the Libyan Bar Association.
In March 2025, individuals from the Internal Security Agency in Benghazi detained lawyer Muneer Abaid, without an arrest warrant, over a dispute concerning his law firm in Benghazi, according to a Libyan human rights group.
In a statement from March 22, 2025, the United Nations Support Mission to Libya (UNSMIL) said that legal professionals and members of the judiciary were being “targeted by violence and arbitrary arrests,” highlighting increased threats against legal professionals that undermined their independence. The “violent arrest” of Judge Ali al-Shareef in Tripoli, in March 2025, and the arbitrary detention in Tripoli of two military prosecutors, Mansour Da’aoub and Mohammed al-Mabrouk al-Kar, in 2022, were among those mentioned. Da’oub was reportedly released in March 2025.
The UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya found that there was no domestic legislation establishing protection measures for witnesses and victims and no security force in Libya “that could provide security protection to the courts, prosecutors’ offices and the judiciary in accordance with international practice.”
The Judicial Police in Tripoli is tasked with managing and securing prisons, providing safety in court rooms and other locations where the justice system operates, securing judicial personnel, and transferring detainees. In western Libya, the Judicial Police—whose members operate with impunity—has at times expanded its mandate beyond its limited tasks to conduct patrols and set up checkpoints in the capital Tripoli.
According to Libya’s GNU Justice Minister Halima Ibrahim Abdelrahman, the Judicial Police are responsible for ensuring that civil, commercial, and criminal justice decisions are implemented. She acknowledged that the Judicial Police conducted patrols in Tripoli, which was not strictly in its mandate and said she had given orders to end these. Abdelrahman also acknowledged that there was overreach or abusive behavior by some members of the Judicial Police. Complaints go through disciplinary boards and anyone under the rank of officer is investigated like any other citizen, she said, but officers accused under criminal law can only be investigated with the Judicial Police commander’s authorization.
The UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya found that the Judicial Police operations section was implicated in attacks on judicial personnel. The Judicial Police deputy director and commander of operations is Osama Almasry Njeem. In January 2025, the ICC issued an arrest warrant for Njeem, accusing him of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including “murder, torture, rape and sexual violence, allegedly committed in Libya from February 2015 onwards.” At time of writing, Njeem remains at large.
Libya’s Penal Code and other related legislation are outdated and in need of comprehensive review to bring them in line with Libya’s international human rights obligations. They contain harsh penalties and provisions that violate human rights, and fail to define torture, rape, and murder when they are committed in the context of armed conflict, as grave international crimes. There is no domestic legal provision directly applying international human rights law, including UN treaties and African Court rulings. Human Rights Watch previously raised the need for legislative reform over a decade ago in 2014.
Libya’s Penal Code was originally issued in 1953, influenced by Italian and French legal systems with elements of Islamic Sharia law. A lawyer at the Libyan Supreme Court described the legislative framework as a “cocktail that includes laws from the former monarchy, the Islamic Sharia, the socialist system, the former Gaddafi regime, and the post-Gaddafi revolutionary phase.”
The Penal Code was amended several times over the decades of Gaddafi’s rule. New laws were also added during the Gaddafi period governing economic and political crimes, and later, crimes that constitute “terrorist acts.” The Penal Code includes laws criminalizing “defamation” of public officials and prohibitions on establishing organizations. Since 2011, Libyan authorities have passed additional abusive laws and decrees, including on cybercrime, terrorism, and provisions curtailing peaceful speech, assembly, and civic work, which constitute serious infringements on the rights to freedom of speech, assembly, and association.
Libyan authorities continue to use myriad overbroad and draconian legacy laws that violate international law to threaten, harass, arbitrarily detain, and attack civil society members and activists who call for reforms. Regulations and decrees on organizing nongovernmental organizations unjustifiably restrict and muzzle civic groups, preventing them from working on judicial reforms, fair trial standards, detention conditions, and abuses committed by armed groups including the Judicial Police.
Penalties under the Penal Code are severe and include corporal punishments such as flogging. Over 30 articles of the Code provide for the death penalty, including for peaceful speech. Libya’s justice minister told Human Rights Watch that a new penal code would be drafted, but gave no timeline for the review or outline of the expected amendments, except that she expected it to increase fines.
Deficiencies in Libyan Domestic Law
Libyan legislation fails to define grave international crimes as such, lacks laws specifically defining and criminalizing war crimes and crimes against humanity, and does not establish witness or victim protection programs. Several provisions on serious crimes are inadequate and not in line with international law. And there is no provision in Libyan domestic law to nullify or allow courts to strike down legislation not in line with international law, including international human rights law.
According to the International Commission of Jurists, Libya’s domestic judicial framework is not in line with international law on torture, as it “fails to criminalize all forms of ill-treatment.” Libya is also not in compliance with international law on the criminalization of enforced disappearance because national legislation does not reflect the gravity of the crime and fails to include all its components, particularly the involvement of an official and a refusal to “disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or acknowledge the deprivation of liberty.”
Libyan law fails to protect “the right to life from all forms of arbitrary deprivation of life,” as it does not criminalize what may amount to arbitrary executions but provides a basis to excuse excessive force by public officials that results in death. It further fails to prohibit summary executions, as the death penalty can be applied after unfair trials.
Libyan laws are inconsistent with Libya’s obligations under international law on the criminalization of rape and other forms of sexual and gender-based violence. While rape is criminalized, some forms of rape are not recognized or captured in law, such as in cases where a victim is unable to provide true consent because of a coercive environment. Libyan laws also allow for the offence of rape and its penal effects to be cancelled if the perpetrator marries the (female) victim. While the Penal Code criminalizes slavery, “it does not provide a definition of the crime,” rendering Libyan legislation out of compliance with international law.
Libyan officials have recognized the shortcomings of the current legal framework. Al-Siddiq al-Sur, Libya’s general prosecutor, agreed on the need for legislative overhaul and a reform of the prison system, saying that, “there is no deterrent for murder in Libya.” According to the justice minister, a national reconciliation project was underway, which included legislation on transitional justice. The House of Representatives passed a law on national reconciliation and transitional justice on January 7, 2025. The text had yet to be published at time of writing.
Detention facilities in Libya are fragmented, violent, and marked by inhumane conditions for Libyans and for migrants and asylum seekers. Torture, ill-treatment, inhumane conditions, arbitrary detention, and overcrowding are rampant and well documented. Human Rights Watch has documented how consecutive interim governments and authorities in Libya have failed to end the arbitrary detention of thousands of people after the 2011 uprising against Muammar Gaddafi or to investigate and hold accountable those responsible.
Many detention facilities are run by non-state actors including militias in the east, south, and west affiliated with the interior, justice, and defense ministries, and with abusive internal security agencies. Libyan authorities have struggled since the 2011 revolution to exercise control over detainees held in militia-run facilities. Al-Siddiq al-Sur, Libya’s general prosecutor, said that prisons are often under the control of “undisciplined” armed groups not directly affiliated with the state, and that “parallel” security forces caused “problems.” He said “real control” of prisons such as Mitiga in Tripoli and Garnada in the east was not under the Justice Ministry and that Saddam Hiftar, a commander in the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF), controlled access to detention facilities in east Libya.
Members of the Libyan Bar Association in Tripoli told Human Rights Watch that detention conditions in prisons nominally under the Justice Ministry were “catastrophic,” including due to overcrowding. They cited cases of alleged rape in detention of young men between 18 and 20 years old.
The UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts found in its December 2024 report that five Libyan armed groups were responsible for “systematic violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, including arbitrary detention, murder and torture,” targeting human rights defenders and journalists in particular. It found that the Judicial Police, in coordination with al-Radaa for Countering Terrorism and Organized Crime—a Tripoli-based Presidential Council) affiliated militia—subjected civilians to “unlawful detention, enforced disappearance, torture and other ill-treatment.” The Panel also documented “cases of unlawful arrest and detention, enforced disappearance, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment committed in temporary detention facilities” controlled by the Tripoli Internal Security Agency.
The GNU justice minister told Human Rights Watch she was not aware of violations in detention facilities under the control or nominal control of the ministry. She said no such complaints had reached the ministry, but also that there were no mechanisms for complaints in prisons as they were “not needed.” She recognized that the lack of a budget to operate prisons and provide for detainees was a key constraint and that overcrowding remained an issue especially in Tripoli, Benghazi, and Misrata prisons, but said some progress had been made on prison infrastructure. To ease overcrowding, the ministry was considering an electronic bracelet system as an alternative to detention for some detainees, including those who are sick.
Libya’s GNU justice minister told Human Rights Watch that every detainee in Libya was detained based on a legal document. However, Libya’s general prosecutor disagreed, saying there was arbitrary detention—for example at Tripoli’s Mitiga prison, controlled by al-Radaa—but not at every prison in Tripoli. The GNU justice minister also said that a dedicated department at the ministry conducted judicial reviews of people sentenced for minor offences and who had completed more than half of their sentences, but did not provide statistics.
Civic groups and independent international organizations do not have regular and unfettered access to formal and informal detention facilities—including those for migrants and asylum seekers—to monitor and evaluate conditions of detention and human rights obligations. Authorities in the east and west prevented members of the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya from visiting detention facilities throughout its mandate, which ended in March 2023. The UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women and girls said she was denied access to detention facilities in east and west Libya during her December 2022 visit.
Human Rights Watch has extensively covered the systematic problems with detention and mistreatment of migrants in Libya, including unaccompanied children and children with their mothers or other relatives, who face widespread abuse by armed groups and prison guards including severe overcrowding, unsanitary conditions, malnutrition, lack of adequate health care, and violent abuse by guards, including beatings and whippings.
In its final report, the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya determined that crimes against humanity were committed against Libyans and migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees in detention in all parts of Libya. The mission concluded that the Interior Ministry-linked Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration, the armed group known as Stability Support Apparatus, and the GNU Defence Ministry-linked Libyan Coast Guard, were responsible for crimes against humanity for abuses of migrants detained in facilities under the effective or nominal control of the GNU. The mission found “arbitrary detention, murder, torture, rape, enslavement, sexual slavery, extrajudicial killing and enforced disappearance” to be widespread in Libya.
Barriers to an Adequate Defense
Defense lawyers in Libya face challenges that impede defendants’ right to a fair trial. Three defense lawyers told Human Rights Watch that they were not permitted to meet with clients during interrogations and initial periods of detention, did not receive notice of hearing schedules, and faced a lack of access to court documents, all of which prevented them from adequately defending their clients. Lawyers also said that members of the prosecution sometimes “treated them badly” at court.
Defense lawyers in Libya face barriers in attending hearings and visiting clients in detention. The Judicial Police is responsible for transferring detainees to court hearings, providing security for all those involved, and is mandated to manage prisons nominally under the Justice Ministry. According to the Libyan Bar Association, officers have prevented defense lawyers from communicating with their clients in court and sometimes even prevented them from attending hearings. The Association and individual lawyers said that Judicial Police officers yell at and insult defense lawyers waiting for their hearings.
“They [Judicial Police] bring in people [detainees] a day before their detention is meant to be extended, so lawyers do not know that their clients will appear in court and do not go to meet them. The same happens when defendants are brought for interrogation. The lawyers are not informed.” The lack of notice to defense lawyers ahead of hearings or interrogations prevents them from adequately defending their clients and results in delays, as judges order the extension of detention without the knowledge of the defendant’s legal counsel, the lawyers said.
Lawyers’ visits to their clients in detention require individual written approvals from the General Prosecutor’s Office, ahead of each visit, and are not conducted privately. There is no designated room where lawyers can meet with their clients in private to prepare for hearings or sessions. Defense lawyers have to use the same visitation areas as families, which in many cases means “yelling at the client” from behind two separation barriers across a gap of several meters, according to a defense lawyer in Tripoli. The Libyan Bar Association also said that some prosecutors do not allow defense lawyers to attend interrogations of their clients, although the general prosecutor said he had asked prosecutors to allow their attendance.
Many well-known lawyers do not agree to take on criminal cases anymore because they have to wait all day to be allowed into hearings and interrogation sessions, the Bar Association said. A defense lawyer in Tripoli who raised the same concerns about access to clients, said that lawyers now tried to work around the prosecution and independently find out when cases were being reviewed.
According to the Bar Association, defense lawyers also face barriers accessing case files held by the prosecution. “When the case is still with the prosecution, before it goes to a criminal court, we are not allowed to photocopy case files, as there is no [copy] machine. We have to write down the details by hand, and often there is no space in the room.”
The Government of National Unity (GNU) justice minister said she had not received any complaints about defense lawyers’ lack of access to prisons under her ministry’s control. Al-Siddiq al-Sur, Libya’s general prosecutor, told Human Rights Watch that such reports of defense lawyers facing obstacles to their work are an “exaggeration,” particularly regarding their ability to attend hearings. He noted that when a lawyer’s name is included in a case file, they should be informed ahead of hearings. He also said he wanted to facilitate defense lawyers’ interactions with prosecutors, and that he had asked police and prosecutors to allow them to attend hearings without impediment and to allow them to make copies of reports and judicial documents. A room with copiers was set aside for defense lawyers at the general prosecutor’s office, he said.
Al-Sur said that the General Prosecutor’s Office had a new inspection unit which investigated errors and abuse of power by prosecutors. A disciplinary council can apply a range of measures to sanction staff, including oral and written warnings and summons, he said. In cases of bribery, a Supreme Court special committee can strip prosecutors of their immunity or dismiss them. Al-Sur said all sanctions are taken into account in the assignments of roles at the beginning of each judicial year. The roles of judicial staff are decided at the beginning of each judicial year in Libya, usually in September, which means that a public prosecutor could end up being assigned the role of judge in the next judicial year.
Complaints against lawyers were abundant, overwhelming the Bar Association, which said it received more than 300 complaints against lawyers for alleged misconduct in the east and west of the country. In one example, they cited the case of a group of lawyers in Derna, eastern Libya, who were suspended from work and referred to interrogation by the eastern attorney general, for having more than one government income source, which is not permitted under Libyan law. Yet, prosecutors can only interrogate lawyers if the secretary general of the Bar Association lifts their immunity, a rule in place since a lawyer was arrested in 2018 and died in detention. The secretary general usually will not waive immunity unless a lawyer is accused of serious misconduct.
The general prosecutor said that defense lawyers bring issues upon themselves because of a “lack of professionalism” and that most prosecutors do not trust them. He claimed some were not registered with the Bar Association and did not have identification cards, while some tried to extort money from their clients, leading to an increase in complaints against lawyers. He criticized the fact that defense lawyers’ immunity could only be lifted by the Bar Association, and not the Supreme Court as with others working in the justice sector.
For a defendant to receive a fair trial under international law, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Libya ratified in 1970, requires that defendants be granted full access to a lawyer, have adequate time to prepare their defense—including presenting arguments and evidence—and have the ability to challenge evidence and arguments presented against them. It further requires that states provide a fair hearing before a legally constituted, competent, independent, and impartial judicial body, a trial without undue delay, and a right to appeal to a higher judicial body.
Obstacles to Summons, Transfer, and Release
The Libyan justice system faces significant obstacles in summoning, transferring, and releasing detainees. Three defense lawyers, a Court of Appeal lawyer, the head of a first instance court, and the general prosecutor said that summons by prosecutors and requests for transfer of detainees were not always respected, and that armed groups and quasi-state forces who controlled detention facilities do not always carry out release orders. This has resulted in major delays and prolonged pre-trial detention of defendants, they said.
Judicial Police officers are responsible for transferring detainees from their places of detention to their hearings, organized in several daily trips. They currently use pick-up trucks with a box-like cover to transport detainees between sessions, but the GNU justice minister said they were in the process of obtaining more humane vehicles such as buses.
Video Hearings
Due to challenges in physically transferring detainees to attend hearings in person, the GNU justice minister said there had been an increase in the use of videoconferencing in cases of serious crimes, where the transfer of detainees caused security risks. She said that “one or two rooms” had been designated for this use in “some prison facilities” and that the practice was in compliance with Libyan law.
In 2014, Libya’s parliament passed a law amending articles 241 and 243 of the Libyan Code of Criminal Procedure, allowing defendants, expert witnesses, and others to testify via “modern communication methods” without having to be in the courtroom. The law stipulates that these measures should be used only in urgent cases and where officials fear for the defendant’s safety. The measures were first used in the 2014 trial of former Gaddafi officials, including Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, although at the time it was not clear that he had waived his right to appear in person.
The head of the Zawiyah Court of First Instance told Human Rights Watch that the use of closed-circuit video to conduct prosecutions, instead of bringing defendants to court to be tried in person, presented an additional fair trial challenge. The camera angle focused on defendants, and it was not possible to see the whole room to ascertain whether they were testifying freely. He said the law needed to be amended to include stricter standards.
Human Rights Watch has found that conducting hearings only by video is inherently abusive as it undermines detainees’ right to be brought physically before a judge to assess the legality and conditions of detention, the well-being of detainees, and for the detainees to be able to speak to the judge directly and to their lawyers without delay and in private.
The fair trial principles articulated by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights hold that the accused has the right to appear in person before a judicial body.
Arbitrary and Provisional Detention
Long-term arbitrary detention and provisional detention are commonplace in Libya. According to Al-Siddiq al-Sur, Libya’s general prosecutor, the majority of detainees were held in pre-trial or pre-charge detention as of September 2024.
According to al-Sur, the use of pre-trial detention has increased to “achieve a deterrent effect.” Although he said he was against the practice, he argued that “if you release someone, the case is closed” due to “open borders, widespread possession of weapons, and banditry” in Libya. An Appeals Court lawyer confirmed that lengthy pre-trial detention was mostly used as a deterrent.
By contrast, the GNU justice minister told Human Rights Watch that “nobody (was) detained in prisons under the Justice Ministry without any legal procedure” and that 70 percent of those held in facilities under her ministry’s control were either being tried or had been sentenced. If a detainee was acquitted and still remained in detention, it was because they were a suspect in other cases, she said, and a new digital database that included all investigations and judgements since 1990 could be used to improve public policies.
Under international and Libyan law, detention is subject to strict due process and authorities must promptly charge or release a person, promptly present them before a judge to rule on the legality of detention, and provide regular opportunities to challenge the lawfulness of detention. Failure to respect such procedural safeguards renders a detention arbitrary. Under international law, pre-trial detention should be the exception and not the rule.
Death Penalty
At least 30 articles in the Libyan Penal Code provide for the death penalty, including for peaceful speech and association. There is a de-facto moratorium on executions in Libya and no death sentences have been carried out under formal state courts since 2010.
According to the general prosecutor, 250 people were sentenced to death in Libya as of September 2024, including legacy cases from before the 2011 conflict. 105 of them had exhausted all appeals. Of the 105, only 19 were still held in detention and three had received waivers from victims’ families, reducing their sentence to life in prison, while the rest were at large.
The general prosecutor told Human Rights Watch he planned to push to resume executions, arguing that Libyans were “indifferent” to killing and that it would be a deterrence.
Human Rights Watch opposes capital punishment in all countries and in all circumstances as a matter of principle because this form of punishment is inhumane, unique in its cruelty and irreversibility, and universally plagued with arbitrariness, prejudice, and error. More than two-thirds of countries have abolished or ceased executions, recognizing that capital punishment violates the right to life and the prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment.
Corporal Punishment
The Libyan Penal Code stipulates corporal punishment for Hudud crimes of alcohol consumption, illicit sexual intercourse, theft and violent theft, and slander. Hudud crimes are derived from the Quran or Sunnah and have mandatory and fixed punishments. These range from lashings to amputation of limbs to the death penalty.
According to lawyers and the general prosecutor, while authorities were not amputating limbs as punishment, lashings for alcohol consumption were being carried out. A defense lawyer said that 40 lashes were usually mandated for the consumption of alcohol.
The general prosecutor said the corporal punishments of lashing and limb amputations were carried out during the former Gaddafi government. But that as a policy, his office currently dismissed charges for morality crimes and illicit drinking in most cases as there was “overcrowding in prisons and many more serious crimes.” The general prosecutor identified rape and sexual assault also as a “morality crime,” but said it was still being punished with up to seven years in prison. In some cases, he said, illicit alcohol consumption was punished with brief imprisonment instead of corporal punishment. The punishment of 80 lashes for adultery still stands for men and women, he said, but Libyan law stipulates that four witnesses are needed to prove adultery and this punishment was sometimes not carried out. He added that the punishment was often converted to 2-3 years in prison.
Corporal punishment constitutes a clear violation of international law, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which prohibits subjecting anyone to “torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” The UN Human Rights Committee explicitly extends this prohibition to corporal punishment. The African Charter states “every individual shall have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being and to the recognition of his legal status. All forms of exploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.” Treating adultery as a criminal offence infringes the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including the rights linked to privacy, and is often used to repress women’s rights.
Failure to Pay Compensation
One of the biggest challenges facing the judicial sector is that sentences against the state are not being implemented. Authorities in the east and west have failed to pay out financial compensation for damages and losses in some cases since 2009, including judgments against the Justice Ministry and the Prime Ministry. The Libyan Bar Association estimated the total amount of unpaid compensation to be around 1 billion Libyan dinar (around US$200 million at the time), and said they met with the finance minister, the prime minister, and the former governor of the central bank, but they all “made excuses.” The state has not designated a budget to pay compensation, which is mostly linked to property damage or loss, said an Appeal Court lawyer.
Clients depend on compensation payments to pay their lawyers, and because compensation is not being paid, clients are often unable to pay their lawyers’ fees. As a result, many private lawyers bringing lawsuits in such cases do not get paid, putting financial strain on them, according to the Bar Association.
According to the general prosecutor, there is a need to increase litigation and implementation of laws on the environment, medical liability, inheritance, and corruption. He said his office trained staff on these issues, leading to a hike in judgments as a result. However, in the absence of a state budget, compensation rulings have accumulated and are not being paid.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) has a mandate to investigate grave international crimes, including alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Libya. It is a court of last resort operating under the “principle of complementarity,” which means that it will only step in if national authorities do not genuinely investigate and prosecute crimes within the ICC’s mandate.
On February 26, 2011, mere days after the start of the revolution that ousted former leader Muammar Gaddafi, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1970, referring the situation in Libya to the ICC prosecutor. On March 3, the prosecutor opened an investigation into alleged crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Libya since February 15, 2011.
On May 12, the Libyan government submitted a declaration to the ICC accepting the court’s jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed in Libya from 2011 to the end of 2027.
Militias and armed groups linked with the competing Libyan authorities continue to commit serious international crimes that may fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction with impunity. These include arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and ill-treatment, and cruel and inhuman or degrading treatment of Libyans and non-Libyans in detention that may constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes. Militias and traffickers, often working in tandem, continue to subject migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees to torture, cruel treatment, trafficking, forced labor, sexual violence, and extortion.
The ICC is not expected to try all crimes or all perpetrators, and there will be limits to the scope and number of cases brought by the Office of the Prosecutor in each situation. Domestic prosecutions of international crimes are both consistent with the principle of complementarity and often necessary to bring about comprehensive accountability. But domestic prosecutions typically face specific obstacles.
The fractured nature of Libya’s judiciary, pervasive fair trial concerns, and unaddressed security concerns for judicial professionals only worsen prospects for independent investigations and prosecutions. Prosecutions of mass atrocity crimes also require specialized expertise and support, including witness protection, and benefit from legal frameworks providing for international crimes and a range of modes of liability. The reforms highlighted in this report are also important for Libya’s ability to bring those responsible for serious international crimes to account.
Cooperation between Libyan Authorities and the International Criminal Court
Fourteen years after the Security Council referral, cooperation with the ICC by Libyan authorities remains largely inadequate. Leading Libyan judicial authorities have gone so far as to oppose the trial of Libyans outside of Libya and to question the need for the ICC’s involvement in some investigations in Libya. This is despite the lack of domestic judicial proceedings for the same crimes being investigated by the ICC, ongoing impunity, and an inadequate domestic legal framework covering grave international crimes.
Resolution 1970 requires Libya to cooperate with the ICC, which includes arresting and surrendering all individuals wanted by the court who are in Libya. Without its own police force, the ICC relies on states to enforce arrest warrants. At the time of writing, the ICC has issued warrants of arrest against 12 individuals in relation to the Libya situation. Three of them have since died and 8 remain at large. ICC judges declared the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi, former intelligence chief under Gaddafi, inadmissible before the court. Consecutive interim authorities and governments in the east and west of the country have failed to arrest and surrender to the court ICC suspects on Libyan territory.
Libya’s Government of National Unity (GNU) justice minister told Human Rights Watch that “as a matter of principle,” she was against extraditing any Libyan national to be tried abroad, and that she had conveyed this message to the court’s prosecutor, Karim Khan, during his visit to Tripoli in April 2024.
Libya’s general prosecutor said the ICC’s investigation in Libya and the issuing of arrest warrants was important and had a deterrent effect to some extent, but that it “was not needed” for the investigation of mass graves in Tarhouna where hundreds went missing between 2013 and 2020. It was not useful for the Court to look into issues of international humanitarian law, he said, arguing that it might harm the Libyan judiciary’s credibility.
Libyan authorities have failed to arrest Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, who is still at large and wanted by the ICC for crimes against humanity and war crimes in relation to the 2011 revolution. Al-Sur said that Gaddafi was wanted by the Libyan authorities, but that his arrest was “not a priority for them.” He said that, during deputy ICC prosecutor Nezhat Shameem Khan’s April 2024 visit, she did not request information about Gaddafi from Libyan authorities. In addition to the ICC case against him, Gaddafi was convicted and sentenced to death in absentia before a Libyan court in 2014, in a process Human Rights Watch found to have been marred by grave due process violations. Under Libyan law, this conviction would require him to be retried, al-Sur said.
Italian authorities did not comply with their obligation to cooperate with the ICC in relation to the Libya situation after failing to surrender Osama Elmasry Njeem, who was in Italy at the time and wanted by the ICC for the war crimes of outrages upon personal dignity, cruel treatment, torture, rape and sexual violence and murder, and the crimes against humanity of imprisonment, torture, rape and sexual violence, murder, and persecution, despite being in Italian custody. On January 18, 2025, the ICC issued a sealed arrest warrant against Njeem.
Italian authorities took him into custody on January 19, but released him citing “procedural technicalities” two days later and transported him back to Libya on an Italian state aircraft on January 21 without informing the ICC. Italy now faces a potential finding of non-compliance by ICC judges, which could then be transmitted to the court’s Assembly of State Parties or the UN Security Council for further action. Libyan authorities did not arrest Njeem upon arrival, as they were obligated to do, and had not commented on his status at time of writing. Njeem is a Judicial Police commander who oversees detention facilities nominally under the GNU, including Mitiga prison in Tripoli notorious for its history of abuse.
Six other suspects remain at large and are wanted by the ICC in relation to their alleged roles in crimes in the city of Tarhouna, where hundreds of people were disappeared and buried in mass graves between 2013 and 2020. Abdurahem Khalefa Abdurahem Elshgagi, Makhlouf Makhlouf Arhoumah Doumah, Nasser Muhammad Muftah Daou, Mohamed Mohamed Al Salheen Salmi, Abdelbari Ayyad Ramadan Al Shaqaqi, and Fathi Faraj Mohamed Salim Al Zinkal are wanted by the court for war crimes including murder, outrages upon personal dignity, cruel treatment and torture. Al Zinkal and Al Salheen Salmi are also wanted for the war crimes of sexual violence and rape.
Future of the Court’s Investigation in Libya
In 2021, the Office of the Prosecutor issued a policy outlining the office’s approach to the completion of its work in a given situation. According to the policy, the investigative phase is completed when the office decides that it will not seek additional arrest warrants in a given situation.
The ICC prosecutor announced in November 2023 that his office planned “to complete investigative activities in relation to the key lines of inquiry” in the Libya situation by the end of 2025. The violations related to some of these key lines of inquiry, in particular crimes against migrants and crimes in detention, are well documented and remain ongoing.
Civil society organizations, including Human Rights Watch, have raised concerns about this timeline, publicly and privately, with the Office of the Prosecutor, citing in particular the ongoing lack of effective cooperation with the ICC by the Libyan authorities, lack of credible domestic prosecutions of serious crimes that continue to be committed across Libya with impunity, and the absence of international oversight following the end of the mandate of the UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya in March 2023.
The ICC Office of the Prosecutor announced in 2024 that inaugurating a liaison office in Tripoli was a priority to further cooperation with domestic authorities, but had not released details at time of writing.
In its response to a letter from Human Rights Watch, the Office of the Prosecutor recalled that completion of its investigative activities in Libya depends on the cooperation of Libyan authorities. According to the office, such cooperation has in practice varied over time including in relation to the execution of ICC arrest warrants. It noted the “difficult situation” of the Libyan judiciary and “credible reports of influential suspects fleeing detention and prisons to thereafter resume their public and private life with impunity.”
The office also noted that the prosecutor welcomed the Libyan government’s May 15, 2025 declaration accepting the court’s jurisdiction for crimes occurring between 2011 and the end of 2027 “as [a] request from Libya to extend the investigation to the end of 2027, with an explicit commitment to cooperate.” In his statement to the UN Security Council on May 15, 2025, the ICC prosecutor re-stated his office’s intention to complete its mandate in Libya under resolution 1970 while also looking at beginning “a new chapter of action and investigations” based on the Libyan government’s declaration.
The Office of the Prosecutor should reassess the timeframe for the completion of its investigative activities in Libya. While not explicitly cited in the office’s policy on situation completion, the readiness of domestic authorities to take up the court’s responsibilities of investigating and prosecuting serious crimes, should be factored in the assessment, as it is critical to avoid exacerbating the existing accountability vacuum. The Office of the Prosecutor is in a unique position to catalyze progress and the much-needed reform of domestic justice, both in law and practice. Addressing serious structural deficiencies in the domestic justice system should be a priority for the ICC’s engagement with Libyan judicial authorities, in addition to capacity-building.
In addition to the wide-ranging legal and practice reforms cited in this report, Libyan authorities should also consider the establishment of an internationalized justice mechanism. Such mechanism, staffed with both international and Libyan practitioners, could complement the work of the ICC and domestic courts and contribute to filling the current accountability gap, while also bolstering the national capacity to investigate and prosecute serious international crimes.
The Office of the Prosecutor should conduct meaningful consultations with survivors, families of victims, affected communities, and civil society groups to ensure that its decisions around the completion of its investigative activities are informed by their views and concerns. Shutting down the office’s investigations prematurely could preclude justice for these crimes and undermine the court’s legitimacy and credibility in Libya.
This report was researched and written by Hanan Salah, associate Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch. Bassam Khawaja, deputy Middle East and North Africa director, edited the report. Senior legal advisor, Clive Baldwin, conducted legal review. Tom Porteous, deputy program director, conducted program review.
Anna Bacciarelli, senior researcher in the Technology, Rights and Investigations division, Bill Frelick, Refugee and Migrant Rights director, Bill Van Esveld, associate Children’s Rights director, Maria Elena Vignoli, senior International Justice counsel, and Skye Wheeler, senior researcher in the Women’s Rights Division, provided specialist reviews.
Charbel Salloum, senior officer in Human Rights Watch’s Middle East and North Africa division, helped prepare the report for publication.
Human Rights Watch would like to acknowledge the willingness of Libya’s general prosecutor and GNU justice minister to meet with researchers and discuss these issues. We express our gratitude to all those who spoke with us during this research, including Libyan lawyers, judges, and civil society members
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